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Abstract: This corpus-based study investigates the complementation patterns of
mental predicates in a cross-linguistic context. More precisely, it examines five
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their complements are cognitively construed in different ways in first-person uses of
those verbs as opposed to third-person uses. Two types of complementation are
considered: we contrast nominal complements with clausal complements. Based on
the results of prior studies into Polish myśleć ‘think’ and wierzyć ‘believe’, we
hypothesize that first-person singular occurrences of mental predicates will be
more readily associated with clausal complements designating non-bounded and
non-picturable objects. Conversely, third-person uses of the verbs are expected to be
linked to nominal complements that denote bounded and picturable objects. The
hypotheses are tested with bivariate and multivariate quantitative techniques. Our
results have both descriptive and theoretical implications. Descriptively, we aim to
identify the differences in construing the complement ofmental predicates, depend-
ing on the grammatical person of the syntactic subject. Theoretically, we provide
empirical evidence that is relevant for the long-recognized distinction between
performativity and descriptivity of mental verbs.
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1 Introduction
Language provides speakers with ample opportunities to express the same idea
in different ways. For instance, mental predicates such as English believe or
forget can occur with a range of different complement types. The two pairs of
sentences in (1) and (2) illustrate how speakers may choose between a nominal
complement and a syntactically more complex clausal structure. In both sets,
the second variant is a constructed version of the first one, which has been taken
from COCA (Davies 2008–2013):
(1) a. I have always believed in fate and destiny.
b. I have always believed that fate and destiny exist.
(2) a. She even forgot his name.
b. She even forgot what his name was.
Why does English provide these two variants, and when do speakers choose one
or the other? The present study addresses this kind of variation and aims to
identify the formal and semantic–pragmatic constraints that determine speakers’
choices between alternate constructions. In order to model this use in a predic-
tively and descriptively accurate manner and to identify the variables that are at
stake, we apply bivariate (Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence) and multi-
variate statistical methods (multiple correspondence analysis and logistic regres-
sion). Taking our cues from the framework of usage-based Construction
Grammar, we assume that “general cognitive, pragmatic, and processing con-
straints” (Goldberg 2006: 3) shape speakers’ use and knowledge of language.
Ultimately, therefore, empirical inquiries into the determinants of constructional
choices are important both descriptively and theoretically.
In the most general terms, the two pairs of sentences in (1) and (2) are
instantiations of an alternation between a nominal and a clausal complement
construction: (SUBJECT + PREDICATE +NOMINAL COMPLEMENT) and (SUBJECT +PREDICATE + CLAUSAL
COMPLEMENT). In these examples, the predicate position is filled by present-perfect-
and simple-past-tense forms of the verbs of cognition believe and forget.
In addition to these two mental predicates, the present study considers three
others, i. e., think, remember, and understand for English and their respective
translational equivalents in German and Polish (see Table 2 for a list of verbs).
In the former utterance of each sentence pair in (1) and (2), the complement is
formally realized as a noun phrase, whereby the mental object is reified. In the
latter sentence, on the other hand, the object is encoded in a clause, which
renders the construal more dynamic or processual. Another important difference
476 Karolina Krawczak et al.
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 3:50 PM
between the examples presented in (1) and (2) is the grammatical person of the
subject of the mental predicate. Based on prior research into the complementa-
tion of mental predicates in Polish (Fabiszak et al. 2012; Krawczak and
Kokorniak 2012; Fabiszak et al. 2014), this difference is here hypothesized to be
a significant variable determining the alternation, arguably irrespective of the
language or the type of the mental predicate.
On the basis of the perfective and imperfective verbal realizations of BELIEVE
in Polish, Fabiszak et al. (2012) demonstrate that complements designating a
private experience, which is less readily accessible interpersonally, are corre-
lated with the perfective aspect of the verb and expressed through clausal
complementation. In turn, an experience that is interpersonally shared has
been shown to be associated with the imperfective aspect and expressed as a
nominal complement; here, the objects thus encoded undergo reification and
acquire a more intersubjectively accessible and hence graspable character. The
correlation of an experience that is publicly available with the imperfective
aspect can be interpreted to indicate that this experience is conceptualized as
more stable and lasting (Fabiszak et al. 2012). In other words, opinions and
beliefs that are held intersubjectively, regardless of what they concern, are likely
to be indefinable in terms of temporal boundaries. It is noteworthy that the
association of clausal complementation with the perfective aspect of the verb
and of nominal complements with the imperfective aspect has also been identi-
fied as statistically significant in Fabiszak et al. (2014), where the analysis
focused on the prefixed forms of myśleć ‘think’.
The results obtained in Krawczak and Kokorniak (2012), in turn, indicate
that first-person singular occurrences of the prefixed and unprefixed forms of
myśleć ‘think’ combine more readily with complements that designate more
complex and abstract objects of thought of lesser tangibility. Such instances
of use afford direct access to the mental object and can be referred to as
“performative” (Nuyts 2001). This is because the speaker, when formulating a
given statement regarding mental states, “subscribes to and accepts respon-
sibility for the epistemic evaluation underlying it” (Nuyts 2001: 385). Third-
person singular occurrences of cognition verbs, on the other hand, which
instantiate “descriptive” attribution-based uses (Nuyts 2001), are compara-
tively more readily associable with concrete objects. Such objects can be
more easily ascribed to third-person subjects on the basis of observation,
where first-hand experience is unavailable. The study presented in Krawczak
and Kokorniak (2012) also reveals a correlation of first-person subjects with
the perfective aspect of the predicate and third-person subjects with the
imperfective. This association may be taken to mean that the descriptive
third-person uses of cognition verbs favor non-bounded forms of mental
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experience, while first-person performative uses are more definite and
bounded in character.1 This preference for unbounded imperfective uses of
verbs like think or believe with third-person subjects may be motivated con-
ceptually by the elusive and ungraspable character of mental states experi-
enced by other subjects. A consequence of this inherent inaccessibility and,
therefore, obscurity of other people’s mental states is that when attributing
such states to others, the speaker is likely to opt for means of expression that
will reflect the uncertainty that marks any such attribution. Additional sup-
port in Krawczak and Kokorniak (2012) for this relatively lower degree of
certainty enjoyed by the speaker in attribution-based uses of mental predi-
cates shows that such uses manifest a statistically significant correlation with
hypothetical adverbial modification, as exemplified by perhaps, probably, or
maybe.
The findings of the above studies lead us to formulate two sets of hypoth-
eses, one concerning the formal characteristics of constructions involving men-
tal predicates, the other dealing with their semantic dimension. The formal
hypothesis states that while first-person singular uses of cognition verbs will
be associated more significantly with clausal complements across the three
languages, their third-person singular occurrences will be linked more canoni-
cally to nominal complements. Regarding the semantic attributes of the comple-
ments of mental predicates, it is hypothesized that more concrete objects of
greater picturability will correspond to third-person singular uses of mental
predicates, while complements designating objects that are relatively more
abstract and hence less picturable will be linked more immediately to first-
person subjects. The hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Hypotheses.
Hypotheses Grammatical person and complement
First person singular Third person singular
Formal dimension Clausal complements Nominal complements
Semantic dimension Abstract/ephemeral objects Concrete/tangible objects
1 The present study, while drawing on these findings, will not test the correlation between the
grammatical person and the grammatical aspect of the mental predicate. Rather, it will focus
exclusively on the lexical aspect of the complement associated with the predicates under
investigation (for further discussion, see Section 3).
478 Karolina Krawczak et al.
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 3:50 PM
While the formal distinction between nominal and clausal complements is
straightforward and does not need to be further operationalized, the semantic
dimension clearly requires a measurable definition. How the abstractness and
tangibility of the object designated by the complement of the mental predicates
have been operationalized will be explained in Section 3. Importantly, these
hypotheses do not concern purely descriptive dimensions. Rather, testing their
accuracy will produce theory-informing results. This will be attained with the
use of bivariate and multivariate statistics. Such methods make possible not
only the identification of “multidimensional and socio-conceptually realistic
profiles” (Glynn 2014c: 311) of the linguistic phenomena under investigation,
but they also provide information about the predictive strength of any patterns
thus revealed.
2 Methodology
The methodology employed in this study is known as Profile-Based Analysis
or Multifactorial Usage-Feature Analysis. It has been developed in the work
of Geeraerts et al. (1994, 1999), Gries (1999, 2003), Heylen (2005), Gries and
Stefanowitsch (2006), Divjak (2006, 2010), Glynn (2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2014b),
Gries and Divjak (2009), Glynn and Fischer (2010), or Glynn and Robinson (2014).
The fundamental assumption here is that contextualized language use can give us
an insight into the structure of language, whether within a single linguistic
community or across different speech communities. This methodology is designed
to model usage or, more precisely, linguistic choices made by speakers, in the
form of frequency-based generalizations across many usage events.
Two specific steps are followed in any study employing this methodology.
The first stage is a fine-grained qualitative analysis, the second one a quantita-
tive modeling of the annotated data. More precisely, the first phase involves
detailed manual annotation of all the occurrences of the phenomenon under
investigation for a range of usage features. These features can concern linguistic
form, in which case the process of tagging the examples can be semiautomated
to various degrees. They can also concern the semantic–pragmatic dimension of
language use, which, in turn, necessitates close reading of the contextualized
examples. The features for which the data are annotated will depend on the
research questions posed in a given study, possible hypotheses to be tested as
well as prior empirical and theoretical investigations in the relevant domain.
This procedure of qualitative analysis of hundreds and commonly thousands of
observations results in a very complex multidimensional grid of usage features.
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Given such a multifaceted nature of the resultant data structure, recourse
must be taken to quantitative analytical tools that can help us reveal the
emergent tendencies in the behavior of the linguistic phenomenon under inves-
tigation. This is the second step in the Multifactorial Usage-Feature Analysis.
There are different techniques that can be implemented at this stage. In the most
general terms, they divide into exploratory and confirmatory methods such as
hierarchical cluster analysis (e. g., Divjak and Fieller 2014) and correspondence
analysis (e. g., Glynn 2014a), in the former case, or logistic regression modeling
(e. g., Speelman 2014), in the latter. Exploratory statistics are used to find orderly
patterns in the data, identified on the basis of frequency-based positive and
negative correlations of usage characteristics. Confirmatory statistics, in turn,
enable us to establish which correlations are statistically significant and impor-
tant in their predictive power and how accurate they are descriptively and
predictively. Both types of analysis are employed in the present study. In
addition, we will also employ bivariate statistics in the form of Pearson’s Chi-
square test of independence, which will be applied in order to test the first
hypothesis concerning the formal dimension of clausal and nominal
complementation.
3 Data and analysis
3.1 Data
The data for this study were extracted from the newspaper and magazine
sections of the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008–2013)
and the National Corpus of Polish (Pęzik 2012). For German, the examples
were taken from a comparable source, the daily newspaper Mannheimer Morgen
(http://www.morgenweb.de/). The choice of the journalistic genre was dictated by
its cross-linguistic comparability and the high likelihood of finding a large number
of the constructions under investigation, where the speaker either presents his or
her own mental state or ascribes such a state to another subject.
The dataset (see Table 5 for the data summary) amounts altogether to over
5,000 occurrences of the mental predicates used in the first- and third
person singular with nominal and clausal complements. The exact proportions
of the complement types were established relative to their distribution in the
respective corpora. Since in this study we were only interested in nominal and
clausal complements, any examples that diverged from this profile were
excluded, e. g., parenthetical uses in which the complement was elided. The
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extraction was based on the following four search strings (FIRST PERSON SG. + MENTAL
PREDICATE + CLAUSE), (THIRD PERSON SG. + MENTAL PREDICATE + CLAUSE), (FIRST PERSON SG. +
MENTAL PREDICATE + NOUN PHRASE), and (THIRD PERSON SG. + MENTAL PREDICATE + NOUN
PHRASE). The keywords in the three languages that filled the mental predicate
slot in these constructions are provided in Table 2.
The verbs were selected as the most representative instantiations of predicates
designating mental states that permit both nominal and clausal complementation
across the speech communities analyzed here. Equal numbers of the past-tense
forms of the five verbs were extracted for each of the three languages. The past tense
was chosen because at least for some of the predicates such as remember or forget
past-tense uses seemmore frequent, which was the only reason why the variable of
the grammatical tense was controlled for. In English and German, both simple-past-
and perfect-tense forms were extracted. In Polish, imperfective aspect forms of
the verbs were retrieved, except zapomnieć ‘forget’, which is much more frequent
in its perfective usage in the sampled component of the corpus (2,316 vs. 135
occurrences).
The exact number of examples involving the two complementation types for
each person was determined proportionally to their relative representation in the
respective corpora. Controlling for the distribution of the complement types
relative to the grammatical person of the predicates was important in the present
inquiry because one of the hypotheses to be tested focuses on this formal
characteristic of usage. The hypothesis in question, as put forward in Section 1
(see Table 1), states that clausal complements are expected to be associated
more significantly with first-person singular uses of the verbs, while nominal
complementation is hypothesized to be more typical of the third-person occur-
rences of the predicates. Taking equal numbers of such observations or deter-
mining the proportions arbitrarily would skew the results.
Another point that should be made with regard to data extraction concerns
clausal complementation alone. For both Polish and German, the extraction of
the mental predicates associated with clausal complements was highly auto-
matic in that in both languages the dependent clause is introduced by a
Table 2: Keywords.
Language Predicate  Predicate  Predicate  Predicate  Predicate 
English think believe understand remember forget
German denken glauben verstehen erinnern vergessen
Polish myśleć wierzyć rozumieć pamiętać zapomnieć
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subordinating conjunction, which is że in Polish and dass in German. The
situation was different in English, where the complementizer that is not an
obligatory element in a dependent clause. For that reason, and insofar as we
did not want to exclude the zero complementizer clauses, the procedure of
selecting examples with clausal complements was more manual here.
3.2 Analysis
All the contextualized examples were annotated for four variables (or factors),
each involving binary distinctions (or levels). The variables were selected as
informative with respect to the choice of complement and as a means to
operationalize the problem and ultimately test the hypotheses formulated in
Section 1. Two of these variables are formal, the two others semantic. The
variables and the respective levels they subsume are presented in Table 3 and
then discussed and exemplified below.
The formal variables have already been illustrated in examples (1) and (2) in
Section 1, and they are straightforward enough not to require any further
explanation here. The semantic variables of boundedness and picturability
were introduced in the study as a way of operationalizing the degree of abstract-
ness or, conversely, concreteness of the object of thought and its resultant
tangibility. This is important for the second hypothesis to be tested in the
present study, which concerns the semantic dimension of the constructions
under investigation (see Table 1). In this regard, it was assumed that objects
that are bounded, either spatially or temporally, and that can be easily pictured
or imagined are relatively more concrete and graspable, whereas those that are
unbounded and non-picturable can be understood to be comparatively more
abstract and considerably less tangible.
Before discussing some actual examples of the two variables, let us define
the notions of boundedness and picturability in conceptual terms. The category
Table 3: Annotation schema.
Variables Levels
Formal Grammatical person First person, third person
Complement type Clausal, nominal
Semantic Boundedness Bounded, non-bounded
Picturability Picturable, non-picturable
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of boundedness,2 as pointed out by Langacker (1999: 223; cf. 2009: 65, 148–149),
is prototypically realized by perfective verbs (e. g., She thought that he had
finished) and count nouns (e. g., She thought about him), while imperfective
verbs (e. g., She thought that they were flying) and mass nouns (e. g., She
thought about space travel) typically, but not necessarily, make “no intrinsic
reference to bounding”. With respect to the category of aspect, as indicated by
Radden and Dirven (2007: 177–178), the perfective imposes a “maximal viewing
frame”, while the imperfective, whether applied to events or states, is associated
with a “restricted viewing frame” and “limited duration”.
In a similar vein, Talmy (2000: 50) defines boundedness, which for him
falls within the “system of configurational structure”, in terms of indefinite
continuation for unbounded events, and as a matter of demarcation and
individuation into a single “unit entity” for bounded quantities. Naturally,
this understanding, as recognized by Talmy (2000), translates directly into
the distinction between mass as opposed to count nouns and imperfective as
opposed to perfective verbs.
However, the distinction is not always that simple, especially in the case of
verbs. For example, if we take the construction [SUBJECT + VERB + in+ AMOUNT OF
TIME], it becomes apparent that such predicates as sleep or read, even though
used in the perfective aspect, are in fact unbounded because they cannot fill in
the predicate slot in the above construction, which specifies boundedness
(cf. Talmy 2000: 51):
(3) a. *He read in three hours.
b. He read for three hours.
To bound the activity, the grammatical operation of “portion excerpting”3
(Talmy 2000: 50) needs to be performed, as illustrated in sentence (3b).4
Here, this period-of-time or “durational” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 180) verb,
whose lexical semantics, irrespective of the grammatical aspect, renders it a
prototypically unbounded activity, is delimited and thus becomes bounded.
2 Boundedness could be investigated in relation to both the mental predicates and their clausal
or nominal complements. However, we will only focus on the latter aspect. The former was
examined in Fabiszak et al. (2014) and in Krawczak and Kokorniak (2012), where perfective and
imperfective forms of Polish myśleć ‘think’ were studied.
3 The same process applies to nouns: compare She thought about music (unbounded) with She
thought about the music of Mozart (bounded).
4 Note that the examples given in (3) and (4) could well be clausal complements of the mental
predicates under analysis in this study.
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On the other hand, processes, events, and activities that are typically point-in-
time or, put differently, brief or “punctual” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 180), and
so bounded in their temporal scope, such as wake up or look through, can be
“debounded” (Talmy 2000: 52) by lexical and/or grammatical means, as illu-
strated in the constructed sentences in (4b) and (4d) below.
(4) a. She woke up at 7 this morning/in two minutes this morning.
b. She was waking up without end, never getting any sleep.
c. She was waking up for two hours.
d. She was waking up for hours and hours.
The utterance in (4a) is a clear case of a bounded action, indicating the exact
temporal scope within the boundaries of which it is circumscribed. Here, there is
no conflict between the grammatical and lexical aspect of the verb. In (4b), on
the other hand, the activity is stretched over time without any demarcation. This
is achieved grammatically through the use of the imperfective progressive aspect
and lexically through the phrase without end, employed by Talmy to the same
effects (2000: 53). In (4c), on the other hand, the lexical specification for two
hours bounds the activity despite its imperfective grammatical aspect, just as in
(4d) the phrase for hours and hours, which is not specific enough to be bound-
ing, keeps the unbounded character of the verb.
The above distinctions concerning boundedness as ascribed to verbs can be
presented in a tabular format, based on the classification proposed by Radden
and Dirven (2007: 177–182). Accordingly, Table 4 outlines the conceptual char-
acteristics of states and events in relation to boundedness and provides ade-
quate examples illustrating the distinctions.
As we can see, states remain unbounded irrespective of the viewing frame,
i. e., regardless of whether we zoom in on a particular temporal excerpt or
consider it holistically. The situation is different with events, where character-
ization in terms of boundedness is much more complex. The complexity is
evidenced by the further subdivision proceeding along the parameters of dura-
tion and telicity. This categorization draws on Vendler’s (1957) classification of
verbs into four mains groups: achievements (telic, instantaneous), accomplish-
ments (telic, durational), activities (atelic, durational), and states (atelic, dura-
tional). Overall, events that are bounded are describable in terms of temporal
boundaries, which can be complete and enclose the event into a holistic unit
(Figure 1a), or partial, i. e., involving only the beginning or the end, as visualized
in Figure 1 (b) and (c), respectively.
It is not necessarily self-evident whether in the case of partial boundaries,
an event should be treated as bounded or not. One solution is to allow for
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different degrees of granularity (e. g., unbounded – semi-bounded – bounded)
and then see which of these levels explains the data best. In the present inquiry,
however, we have opted for a maximally elegant and thus the simplest possible
set of explanatory variables, i. e., we will draw a two-way distinction and treat
half-bounded processes as bounded.
The other explanatory variable for which our data were manually annotated
is picturability. Its positive value, i. e., picturable, can be assigned to those
things, relations, processes, or events that can be perceived visually. In the
case of things, this will normally mean that mass nouns will be more typically,
though not necessarily, non-picturable, while count nouns should, by definition,
be picturable. This is because they normally constitute integral wholes that are
easily evoked as such. In the most prototypical cases of picturability, therefore,
this will ultimately mean that an object can be graphically represented, e. g., in a
drawing. In less representative instances, it will mean that if we were to be
Table 4: Boundedness and verbs.
Object type and conceptual properties Exemplification
Unbounded permanent states
– Stability, homogeneity, and infiniteness She lives in Europe
– Maximal viewing frame She loves her job
Unbounded nonpermanent states
– Stability, homogeneity but implied
boundaries
She is living in Europe
– Restricted viewing frame She is loving her new job
Bounded events Durational and telic Punctual and telic
– Internal dynamism and heterogeneity She wrote an article She woke up
– Holistic and external conceptualization Durational and atelic Punctual and atelic
– Maximal viewing frame She swam in a pool She sneezed
– Definable in terms of duration and telicity
Unbounded events Durational and telic Durational and telic
– Internal dynamism and heterogeneity She’s writing an article. She is waking up
– Non-holistic and internal
conceptualization
Durational and atelic Durational and
atelic
– Restricted viewing frame She is swimming in a pool She is sneezing
– Definable in terms of duration and telicity
(a) |–––––––––––| (b) –––––––––––| (c) |–––––––––––
Figure 1: Boundedness of processes.
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presented with a photo, e. g., of an event such as a conference, a birthday party,
or a wedding reception, we would be able to recognize it on the basis of the
image thus captured.
Now that the two factors have been defined, we can consider examples from
our dataset that will provide specific illustrations of the distinctions drawn here.
Let us first look at the positive values of the two semantic factors, i. e., bound-
edness and picturability, starting with the former. Examples (5) and (6) both
illustrate bounded objects, the difference being the type of complementation
and hence the type of boundaries that operate in each case.
(5) The fuzzy hand pocket lining saved the day when I forgot my gloves.
(Bounded, nominal)
(6) We went on two chic, fabulous dates. And then he never called again. Every
single day, men don’t call women back. But to say that I was utterly devastated
by it does not properly describe the deep pain this rejection unleashed in me or
how clearly it brought into focus my chaotic, disordered life. I believed I had
lost the prince to grant all my deeply buried wishes. (Bounded, clausal)
In sentence (5), the object is encoded by a nominal complement of forget and it
is a clear instance of a thing that is spatially delimited. We might say, following
Langacker (1999: 59), that it constitutes “a specific bounded region within” the
category of clothes. A case of temporal demarcation is instantiated in example
(6), where the subject expresses an emotionally charged belief she held regard-
ing the loss of a man she had been interested in. An important indicator of the
boundedness of the verb lose is the fact that it is used in the perfective aspect,
which clearly defines its temporal scope. We view the event from an external
and maximal or general perspective, rather than zooming in on any particular
event. Finally, it is noteworthy that in Vendler’s verbal classification, it would
constitute an instance of achievement, as losing something or somebody suggests
a telic and punctual event.
With regard to picturability, then, its positive value is exemplified in sen-
tences (7) and (8). In the former case, the object that is categorized as picturable
is encoded as a noun phrase; in the latter, it is rendered in a clause.
(7) As I so vividly remembered Sister Mary’s bedside prayers, her kind
smiling face, her white habit with its centerpiece of her pectoral
cross…. (Picturable, nominal)
(8) The moment my chin hit the bottom of the pool, I understood what had
happened. It was the shallow end. I had shattered two vertebrae in my
spine. (Picturable, clausal)
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The utterance in (7) enumerates a number of objects in the complement of
remember, all of which can be described as visually perceivable. First,
we have the specific activity performed by a specific person at her bed, which
must have been witnessed by the speaker and so it can be easily brought back in
memory and vividly so. Then, the focus shifts to the physical characteristics
of the person, her face and clothes, both of which can be perceived effortlessly.
At the same time, all of these objects are also bounded either temporally, in
the case of the bedside prayers, or spatially, in the case of the smiling face and
the white habit. The example in (8) is an instance of a picturable object
expressed in a dependent clause of the verb understand. Here, the speaker
describes a diving accident, as a result of which he was left paralyzed. The
verb happen, used in the past perfect tense, refers not only to the moment of
impact, but also to the whole situation, including the jump and its tragic
consequences, all of which can be visually experienced.
Let us now consider the negative values in the two attributes, i. e., non-
bounded and non-picturable. The former quality is exemplified in sentences
(9) and (10), the latter in (10) and (11). As before, we will consider examples
of such objects encoded as nominal and clausal complements. Sentence (9) is
a case of a non-bounded clausal object, while in (10), the object is an
abstract noun:
(9) At times I forgot that I was watching television, which inevitably means
that I was being sold something. (Non-bounded, clausal)
(10) She thought and read a lot about happiness, but mostly she achieved that
delicious state by setting herself specific, tangible tasks for different areas of
her life. (Non-bounded, non-picturable, nominal)
In the former sentence, the activity described in the dependent clause of forget is
expressed in the imperfective aspect and, additionally, the mental predicate is
modified by the adverb at times. Both these features point to the continuous
character of the process of watching television. We should also note that the
lexical semantics of the predicatewatch lends itself easily to such an unbounded
temporally extended reading. Despite its non-bounded character, the activity is
clearly picturable. In the utterance in (10), the object of think is also unbounded,
but here it is an abstract noun describing a generic emotional state of happiness.
This sentence simultaneously provides an example of an object that is
clearly not picturable. While one might be able to visually perceive an instance
of happiness, the state in general is too abstract to visualize. Example (11)
illustrates a non-picturable clausal object:
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(11) In my career as a family therapist, I earnestly believed environment
played the greatest role in shaping who we become as people.
(Non-picturable, clausal)
Here, the complement of believe encodes a proposition which is too abstract and
too complex to be amenable to visual perception.
The distinction between bounded and non-bounded objects is not always
straightforward. For example, in (12), the predicate in the dependent clause is
used in the nonprogressive aspect and so, on such formal grounds, might be
regarded as bounded.
(12) Up until day three, in fact, I’d believed that any successful backcountry
trek required bluebird skies and bright sunshine.
However, there are two aspects to be considered here. First, the predicate
designates a certain state of affairs, rather than an event, and states, as noted
earlier, are always unbounded. This is true irrespective of whether they are
permanent or not and regardless of whether they are expressed through the
perfective or imperfective aspect. Second, the process designated by the verb
require is additionally de-bounded by its subject any successful trek, which
generalizes the statement and takes it beyond any specific boundaries.
Example (13), in turn, involves nominal complementation, where the noun
darkness, typically an uncountable abstract noun, would normally be classified
as unbounded.
(13) I remembered a darkness barely illuminated by too few streetlights.
In this sentence, however, darkness is preceded by the indefinite article and is
further post-modified phrasally. This clearly “establishes a selective window of
attention”, to use Talmy’s (2000: 284) wording, on some specific instance of
darkness that is thus bounded both in space and time.
Another potentially problematic example involving nominal complementa-
tion and the possibility for either a bounded or unbounded reading is given in
(14a) and (14b).
(14) a. Zawsze wierzyłem w zwycięstwo, choćby nawet nie było ku temu pod-
staw (…)
‘I always believed in victory, even if there was no reason for that.’
b. Teraz wierzyłem w szybkie zwycięstwo.
‘Now I believed in a quick victory.’
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In (14a), victory is treated as a general abstract phenomenon and is conceptua-
lized from a maximal viewing frame. In other words, we are not focusing on any
specific instance of winning some specific event. This is further reinforced by the
generalizing adverbial modification of the predicate through zawsze ‘always’,
which implies the continuous homogeneous nature of the mental experience
and, hence, by extension, of the object of belief. In (14b), on the other hand, the
speaker is clearly referring to a specific event and a specific instance of victory,
szybkie zwycięstwo ‘a quick victory’. Here, as was the case in (13), our attention
zooms in on a particular type of the phenomenon in question. In addition, the
predicate is modified by the specifying adverb teraz ‘now’, which simulta-
neously narrows down the object of belief even further.
The annotation was performed by the three authors of the present paper,
with each taking the data for one language only. Once the annotation had been
completed, the Polish and English data were submitted to secondary annotation
for the two semantic factors. Thus, the Polish data were annotated by the person
previously responsible for the English data, and vice versa. This procedure was
motivated by the fact that some inconsistencies were identified in the under-
standing of the two categories between the two annotators. The objective here
was to eradicate any mistakes in the annotation. In order to achieve this goal,
we first re-annotated a small sample from each dataset and then discussed any
differences in order to fine-tune our operational definition of the two semantic
categories. The definition and some examples were then consulted with the third
author, responsible for the German dataset. Following this input, the definition
was further refined and then applied methodically to all the examples in Polish
and English. Any observations, where the results of the primary and secondary
annotation diverged, were closely reconsidered and a final decision was
made as to their status. The summary of the data is presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Data summary.
Variable Levels Total
Lexeme believe  glauben  wierzyć  ,
forget  vergessen  zapomnieć  ,
remember  erinnern  pamiętać  
think  denken  myśleć  ,
understand  verstehen  rozumieć  
Complement type Clausal: , Nominal: , ,
Grammatical person First person: , Third person: , ,
Boundedness Bounded: , Non-bounded: , ,
Picturability Picturable: , Non-picturable: , ,
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It specifies the exact distribution of the semantic and formal variables as well
as the number of predicates per language.
4 Results
This section presents the quantitative results of the study. This will be done in two
steps. First, in Section 4.1, we will test the formal hypothesis concerning the
distribution of clausal and nominal complements. Given the simple binary nature
of the hypothesis, this will be attained through the use of the bivariate Chi-square
test for independence. Second, in Section 4.2, we will test our hypothesis regarding
the semantic characteristics of the complement. To that purpose, wewill employ the
exploratory method of binary correspondence analysis and the confirmatory
method of mixed-effects logistic regression modeling.
4.1 Formal hypothesis testing
In this section, we test the first hypothesis put forward in Section 1 concerning
the relation between the grammatical person of the mental predicate and the
form of the complement. On the basis of prior findings for Polish wierzyć
‘believe’ and myśleć ‘think’, it was proposed that the first-person occurrences
of verbs of cognition will be significantly associated with clausal comple-
ments, while third-person uses of such verbs will be positively correlated
with nominal complementation. It was also assumed that such results will be
obtained irrespective of both the type of mental predicate involved and the
language that is sampled. In other words, we expect that for both grammatical
persons, a clear and consistent pattern in complementation preferences will
emerge across the three languages and the five verbs, a pattern that will
conform to the hypothesized dichotomy. To see whether this is indeed the
case, we subdivided the data into two groups, depending on the grammatical
person of the predicate: one group contained all the occurrences of the first-
person uses of the mental predicates across the three languages, while the
other consisted solely of the third-person uses of the verbs in the three
linguistic communities. These two sets were then each submitted separately
to the bivariate Chi-square test for independence to establish whether the first-
person uses indeed correlate significantly with clausal complements and
third-person occurrences with nominal complementation, as assumed in
hypothesis 1. The difference in complement preferences was found to be
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statistically significant in both instances, with p < 0.001. Table 6 shows the
observed (O) and expected (E) frequencies for all the predicates, demonstrating
a clear discrepancy between the two.
The expected frequencies would be observed if the null hypothesis were to be
true. In other words, they would hold true if there was no difference in pre-
ference for either type of complementation. As the results indicate, this is clearly
not the case here. The Pearson residuals obtained for both types of complements
are presented graphically in Figure 2. They are calculated on the basis of the
following formula (from Gries 2014: 370):
Observed−Expected
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Expected
p
The dot plot on the left visualizes the behavioral patterns of the verbs relative
to clausal complementation; the plot located on the right shows the usage
tendencies of the predicates with respect to nominal complementation. The
predicates in relation to language are listed on the left along the vertical axis
of the first map, but they are relevant to both plots. The horizontal axes, in
turn, provide the scale for the Pearson residuals, against which to evaluate the
degree of association of the predicates with either type of complementation or
their disassociation from either. Positive and negative values are indicative of
Table 6: Expected and observed frequencies.
Mental predicate Clausal complementation Nominal complementation
Expected Observed Expected Observed
BELIEVE ENG .  . 
BELIEVE GER .  . 
BELIEVE PL .  . 
FORGET ENG .  . 
FORGET GER .  . 
FORGET PL .  . 
REMEMBER ENG .  . 
REMEMBER GER .  . 
REMEMBER PL .  . 
THINK ENG .  . 
THINK GER .  . 
THINK PL .  . 
UNDERSTAND ENG .  . 
UNDERSTAND GER .  . 
UNDERSTAND PL .  . 
ENG: English; GER: German; PL: Polish.
Mental predicates and their complementation 491
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 3:50 PM
positive and negative correlation, respectively, in this regard. Finally, points 1
and 3 scattered in the dot plots correspond to the first- and third-person
occurrences of the verbs.
Before we consider the specific results, two general observations can be
made. First, as evidenced in Figure 2, our hypothesis appears to be only partially
confirmed. The supporting evidence that we find for it can be described as verb-
specific. This, in turn, takes us to the second observation, namely, that the
results reveal the importance of the verb to the structuring of the data in terms
of complementation patterns. More specifically, the findings suggest that the
lexical semantics of the specific cognition verbs overrides the hypothesized
relation between grammatical person and syntactic complexity. More impor-
tantly, the corresponding verbs across the three languages exhibit the same
tendencies: regardless of the grammatical person, the verbs are consistently
positively or negatively correlated with one of the two complement types.
Overall, therefore, we can say that even though we seem to have found partial
evidence for our hypothesis, it is, in fact, an epiphenomenal result of the specific
verbs. This is evident from the fact that the two dot plots are mirror reflections of
each other, where the correlation of each verb with one type of complementation
is the exact inverse of its correlation with the other type. Let us now turn to the
specific results for clausal complementation, visualized in the first dot plot in
Figure 2.
Here, it was hypothesized that the preference for clausal complementation
would be predominantly observed for the first-person uses of the mental pre-
dicates. The values of the Pearson residuals can be used to establish the relative
rank or importance of the given positive or negative correlation. Interestingly,
when we look at the bottom half of the dot plot, where all the positive
Clausal Complementation Nominal Complementation
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Believe English
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Understand English
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Understand Polish
Forget English
Forget German
Forget Polish
Remember English
Remember German
Remember Polish
Figure 2: Pearson residuals for clausal and nominal complementation across first- and third-
person uses of mental predicates in German, English, and Polish.
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correlations are found, we can see that the strongest association with clausal
complements obtains for the third-person uses of believe in English, immediately
followed by the third-person occurrences of its German cognate. This association
of third-person uses of BELIEVE in the two languages with clausal complementa-
tion goes directly against our claim. The next strongest correlates for clausal
complementation are first-person occurrences of think and believe in English and
myśleć ‘think’ in Polish, followed by third-person uses of denken ‘think’ in
German and first-person uses of wierzyć ‘believe’ in Polish. The weakest associa-
tion holds for first-person uses of understand in English. Interestingly, verstehen
‘understand’ in German and rozumieć ‘understand’ in Polish are negatively
correlated with clausal complementation, which (given the values of the
Pearson residuals) is particularly salient for the former language. Along with
its relatively weak positive correlation for English, this might suggest that the
category UNDERSTAND inherently prefers reified objects expressed nominally. The
verbs forget and remember and their equivalents in German and Polish manifest
a clear dissociation from clausal complementation.
When we consider the visualization for nominal complementation in the
second dot plot in Figure 2, we can observe an overall pattern that mirrors that
found in the first dot plot. It shows a clear transition from predicates favoring
one type of the complement to those associated more distinctly with the other.
Overall, the same predicates manifest the same complementation preferences
across their first- and third-person uses. This pattern emerges as independent of
the language. What it means is that, rather than being constrained by the
grammatical person or cross-linguistic variation, complement choice appears
to be determined by the lexical semantics of the mental predicate. Admittedly,
however, there is a weak effect of the grammatical person on the strength of the
observed association, which might ultimately imply some influence of this factor
on the behavior of the predicates, both intra- and interlinguistically. Whether
such an interpretation is correct, and if so, to what extent, would require further
investigation.
As the results in this section demonstrate, our hypothesis regarding the
influence of grammatical person on the choice of the complement type finds
only partial support. Whatever evidence we identify is weakened by overall
lexical effects. We therefore need to conclude that the lexical semantics of the
mental predicates under investigation here overrides the expected construc-
tional profiling. A regular pattern has emerged across the three linguistic com-
munities, where the verbal instantiations of BELIEVE and THINK are strongly
associated with clausal complementation, while those of REMEMBER and
FORGET are distinctly associated with nominal complements. The usage patterns
manifested by the exponents of UNDERSTAND are slightly more language-specific in
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that in German and Polish, they are aligned with the predicates leaning toward
nominal complementation, while understand in English remains rather non-
distinct in its complement preferences. We need to conclude, therefore, that
we do not find conclusive evidence for our first hypothesis.
4.2 Semantic hypothesis testing
In this section, the second hypothesis, regarding the relation between the
grammatical person and the conceptual properties of the complement, is
tested through multivariate statistical modeling. This will be done in two
steps. First, the exploratory method of binary correspondence analysis will
be employed to identify the behavioral tendencies of the predicates in their
functional context of use (i. e., language, grammatical person, and the con-
ceptual characteristics of the complement). Next, the confirmatory technique
of mixed-effects logistic regression analysis will be used to see whether any of
the patterns thus identified are statistically significant and accurate in both
predictive and descriptive terms.
4.2.1 Exploratory results
The exploratory results are visualized in Figure 3. The plot is a binary corre-
spondence analysis showing the correlations obtaining between the lexemes as
used in the first and third person singular in their respective linguistic commu-
nities and the conceptual characteristics manifested by the complement. For the
purposes of this analysis, the two semantic variables have been combined,
resulting in a four-way distinction instead of two binary factors. Before we
consider the specific correspondences that emerge in the plot, let us briefly
introduce the method employed here.
Correspondence analysis is a “space-reduction technique” (Glynn 2014a:
443); it yields a biplot of the metadata on the basis of the “Chi-squared distance
matrices” (Baayen 2008: 129) calculated for the variables subjected to the map-
ping. The relative proximity of the respective data points in the plot can be taken
as an indication of the strength of their correlation (Glynn 2014a). The size of the
data points reflects the contribution of a given feature to the structuring of the
data in the visualization. Finally, the overall accuracy of the representation in the
two-dimensional map can be established on the basis of the percentages provided
for each axis. This tells us how much variation in the data is explained in these
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two visualized dimensions (Glynn 2014a). In the case of the plot presented in
Figure 3, we can see that we account for over 60% of variation in the first
dimension and for another 30% in the second dimension. This is an excellent
result. Let us now see what patterns are identified here.
In the most general terms, the plot reveals four main groupings of usage
features, each organized around a different semantic value of the complement.
For clarity, these four individual sets have been encircled in the plot. They are
distributed across the four quadrants of the map. The location of some of the data
points for the predicates shows that they are attracted by two or even three
clusters simultaneously. Another macro-level observation that can be made here
is that the plot further divides diagonally into two parts, as indicated in the figure.
The common denominators of the two parts are constituted by the two values of
boundedness and picturability. Finally, it should be noted that the lexemes which
are positioned in the middle of the plot, i. e., third-person singular uses of
vergessen ‘forget’ in German and first-person singular occurrences of think in
English, clearly lack distinct correlations. This is further corroborated by the
relatively small size of these data points. Their location discloses their
apparent association with all four clusters. Let us now consider more closely the
four groupings that emerge in Figure 3 and examine how the usage patterns relate
Object Non-bounded Picturable
Object Non-bounded Non-picturable
Object Bounded Non-picturable
Figure 3: Binary Correspondence Analysis: Lexeme–Language–Person and Object Type.
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to our second hypothesis. To facilitate interpretation, the results are presented in
tabular format in Table 7.
Evidence that would support our hypothesis should indicate positive correla-
tions between the first-person occurrences of the predicates and objects that are
non-bounded and non-picturable. Conversely, for the third-person observations
of the verbs of cognition, we should see distinct associations with bounded and
picturable objects. Objects that can be described as bounded but non-picturable
or non-bounded but picturable, being transient categories between the other two
cases, should ideally correlate with the smallest number of uses. As can be seen
in Table 7, the actually observed correspondences are not consonant with what
was expected. More precisely, it will be seen that the specific correspondences
obtaining for the four clusters are determined by lexical semantics and language
rather than by constructional preferences.
Let us consider the first grouping for non-bounded and non-picturable
objects. In Figure 3, this cluster is located at the intersection of the left-hand
bottom and upper quadrants. It is associated with five predicates. The first
among these is glauben ‘believe’ in German, for both grammatical persons. The
position of these two data points in the plot is indicative of the positive
correlation of glauben in the first and third person with non-bounded and
non-picturable objects. In addition, this type of objects is also correlated with
wierzyć ‘believe’ in Polish and verstehen ‘understand’ in German for the third
person singular. Such associations go directly against our hypothesis. In the
first person singular, believe in English is also part of this grouping, which, in
Table 7: Clusters revealed in the binary correspondence analysis.
Non-bounded Non-bounded Bounded Bounded
Non-picturable Picturable Non-picturable Picturable
First person BELIEVE (Ger.) REMEMBER (Ger.) BELIEVE (Pol.) REMEMBER (Pol.)
BELIEVE (Eng.) THINK (Ger.) UNDERSTAND (Pol.) REMEMBER (Eng.)
UNDERSTAND (Eng.) FORGET (Eng.)
UNDERSTAND (Ger.) FORGET (Pol.)
THINK (Pol.)
Third person UNDERSTAND (Ger.) REMEMBER (Ger.) UNDERSTAND (Pol.) FORGET (Eng.)
BELIEVE (Ger.) THINK (Ger.) UNDERSTAND (Eng.) FORGET (Pol.)
BELIEVE (Pol.) THINK (Eng.) REMEMBER (Pol.)
BELIEVE (Eng.) THINK (Pol.)
Eng.: English; Ger.: German; Pol.: Polish.
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turn, is in line with the hypothesis. It should be noted, however, that first-
person uses of believe, third-person uses of wierzyć ‘believe’ as well as, to a
lesser degree, third-person occurrences of verstehen ‘understand’ are all simul-
taneously attracted by bounded and non-picturable objects. A cluster for this
type of objects is centered on the y-axis, being thus spread across the bottom
half of the plot. When we look at Figure 3, the partial overlap between these
two clusters can be taken as an indication of this. Some of these correspon-
dences are illustrated in sentences (15)–(19).
(15) Auch dass sie krank sei glaubte er nicht.
‘Also he did not believe that she was sick.’
(16) Er verstand nichts von den mathematischen Gesetzen der Bewegung.
‘He did not understand anything of the mathematical laws of motion.’
(17) Ich habe nur in den Spiegel gestarrt und nicht geglaubt, was ich hörte.
‘I just stared in the mirror and did not believe what I heard.’
(18) I believed that my personality and sense of self were too well-defined for me
to harm myself or others.
(19) Sam Gallup wierzył w zbiorową mądrość prostych ludzi, a nie ufał polity-
kom.
‘Sam Gallup believed in the collective wisdom of simple people, and didn’t
trust politicians.’
The second group of verbs, located in the left-hand upper quadrant of the plot,
is associated with non-bounded and picturable objects. This is a very consistent
class both along lexical and linguistic lines. It brings together the verbal expo-
nents of THINK and REMEMBER in German for both grammatical persons. Given that
it is only German occurrences of the verbs that we find here, this cluster is more
informative with respect to the usage tendencies of these two mental predicates
in German than it is with regard to the constructional profiling of mental
predicates. One more point that deserves our attention is that the first-person
singular uses of erinnern ‘remember’ are located in the intersection of this cluster
and the one discussed above, which suggests that these uses of erinnern are also
linked to non-bounded and non-picturable objects. This, in turn, can be inter-
preted to mean that the complements associated with erinnern in the first person
tend to designate non-bounded objects. The correlations found in this cluster are
exemplified in (20)–(23).
(20) Der Kühlschrank war leer, erinnerte ich mich heute nicht zum ersten Mal.
‘The fridge was empty, as I remembered not for the first time today.’
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(21) Als Kasimir das Wort süß hörte, erinnerte er sich sofort an süße Schnecken…
‘As Kasimir heard the word sweet, he immediately remembered sweet rolls…’
(22) Ich dachte, ich würde noch länger am Krankenbett bleiben
‘I thought I would stay longer still at the sickbed.’
(23) Sie dachte an die Traurigkeit, die sie so oft bei ihm beobachtet hatte.
‘She thought about the sadness that she had observed with him so often.’
In the bottom half of the plot, we find the cluster associated with bounded and
non-picturable objects, which for the first person accommodates the verbal
instantiations of UNDERSTAND across the three linguistic communities and wierzyć
‘believe’ in Polish. This type of objects is also correlated strongly with the
third-person uses of understand in English and the relevant equivalent in
Polish and, to a lesser degree, with the third-person occurrences of think and
believe in English. However, the verbs that are clearly most distinctly asso-
ciated with bounded and non-picturable objects are English understand and
Polish rozumieć ‘understand’, used in both grammatical persons, as is evi-
denced by their location in the plot. Polish exponents of BELIEVE in the first
person and English uses of think and believe in the third person are less
prominent members of this class, being simultaneously attracted to bounded
and picturable objects in the case of the two former predicates and to non-
bounded and non-picturable objects for English believe in the first person
singular. Given these associations, we can see that irrespective of the lan-
guage, the verbal uses of UNDERSTAND tend to be associated with objects that are
non-picturable. In both English and Polish, they also lean toward bounded
objects, as illustrated in (24) and (25). In German, in turn, we can observe a
tendency toward non-bounded objects, especially for the third-person occur-
rences of verstehen ‘understand’, as exemplified in (26).
(24) Mąż nie rozumiał potrzeb żony.
‘The husband didn’t understand his wife’s needs.’
(25) I understood and understand today and respect the decision that the
president made.
(26) der ›Coldman‹ sprach unaufhörlich in einer Sprache, die sie nicht verstand.
‘He said something inaudibly in a language, which she did not
understand.’
Finally, the largest cluster of mental predicates is organized around objects that
can be defined as bounded and picturable. For the first person singular, this
type of objects is associated with the instantiations of REMEMBER and FORGET in
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Polish and English and with myśleć ‘think’ in Polish. On the basis of the location
of these data points, we can see that the first four are distinctly associated with
bounded and picturable objects, while the last one appears to be attracted, to a
smaller extent, also by objects that are non-bounded and non-picturable. With
regard to third-person occurrences, which in light of our hypothesis should be
particularly numerous here, we only have four associations, i. e., pamiętać
‘remember’ and its English equivalent, both of which are close correspondences,
and the Polish and English exponents of FORGET. In the case of FORGET, the
association is considerably less distinct for English, for which we can observe
a simultaneous usage tendency toward bounded and non-picturable objects. It is
evident that this cluster is uniform both lexically and linguistically. These
regularities demonstrate that the common conceptual denominator here is not
the grammatical person, but lexeme and language. Some examples for this
cluster are given below.
(27) Rodzina bardzo szybko zapomniała o staruszce.
‘The family forgot about the old lady very quickly.’
(28) Zapomniałam o magnoliach, które stały w wodzie na stole.
‘I forgot about the magnolias that were standing in water on the table.’
(29) Kobieta jednak pamiętała co się wydarzyło i zgłosiła sprawę na policję.
‘The woman, however, remembered what had happened and reported the
case to the police.’
(30) Pamiętałem ich z twarzy.
‘I remembered them by face.’
What can we conclude based on this exploratory investigation into the
conceptual effects observed for the objects of mental predicates? Undoubtedly,
the distribution of the predicates relative to grammatical person fails to provide
supportive evidence for the patterns that were expected in light of our semantic
hypothesis. The discrepancies across the clusters in terms of grammatical person
as well as lexical and linguistic effects show yet again that it is lexical semantics
and, in this case, also variation across the three languages that override possible
constructional profiling. Among the most conspicuous tendencies that are
observed are the cross-linguistic preferences of the verbal instantiations of
REMEMBER and FORGET for picturable objects and of UNDERSTAND for non-picturable
objects. Boundedness appears to be less lexically determined. Indeed, there are
some indications that the correlation of boundedness with the objects of mental
predicates might be the result of the construal imposed by the grammatical
person. This is the case for English believe, which is associated with non-bounded
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objects in the first person, but bounded objects in the third person. Similarly,
German verstehen ‘understand’ and Polish wierzyć ‘believe’ are both associated
with non-bounded objects in the third person, but with bounded objects in the
first person. Could this be taken to mean that boundedness might give us a better
insight into construal differences in mental predicates relative to the grammatical
person? To see if this is the explanatory variable that can indeed help us account
for the choice of construal in cognition verbs, we will now turn to the confirma-
tory method of logistic regression analysis.
4.2.2 Confirmatory results
In this section, we turn to confirmatory statistical modeling of the choice
between the first-person and third-person construal with mental predicates
relative to the conceptual properties of the complement. More specifically, we
will use mixed-effects binary logistic regression modeling with the lexical cate-
gory and language treated as random variables. The reason for treating these
factors as random and thus excluding their contribution is the variation that
they introduce, which has been identified already at the exploratory stage in
Section 4.2.1. Adding these two variables as random variables to our model
enables us to account for this variation while filtering out the statistical noise
that they would introduce. There is also another reason for treating the lexeme
as a random variable, which is the constructional, rather than lexical, focus of
the present study.
Two models were fitted: one with the predictor Object Type, characterized by
a four-way distinction, as already employed in the correspondence analysis in
Section 4.2.1, the other with two separate predictors boundedness and pictur-
ability. In the latter model, only the former variable, i. e., boundedness, turned
out to be statistically significant. This fact might be taken as a tentatively
affirmative answer to the question posed at the end of the previous section.
Given that in all the other respects, the two models are nearly identical, we will
here look at the model where Object Type incorporating a four-way distinction
was used as an explanatory variable. Table 8 presents the results of this
analysis.
The accuracy of the model can be evaluated on the basis of the C statistic
score provided at the bottom, which is at 0.65. This diverges by at least 0.05
from a value that would indicate “acceptable discrimination” (Hosmer and
Lemeshow 2000: 162), which means that the model is not predictively strong.
Before we consider the levels of the predictor, let us note that the variance
values for the random effects, neither of which is zero, suggest that if the
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variables were not treated as random here, they would be likely to affect the
results to a greater or lesser extent. To assess whether the independent variable
can be regarded as a statistically significant and important predictor determin-
ing the use of the first- over third-person uses of the mental predicates, we need
to look at the last and second columns of Table 8, respectively. The last column
provides the p value, which has here been calculated through Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling.
As we can see, the only level that proves statistically significant is that
which denotes non-bounded and non-picturable objects. This feature has a
positive estimate, which means that it is associated with the third-person uses
of the mental predicates.5 The effect size of this association, which can be
evaluated on the basis of the estimate value provided in the second column of
Table 8 and which serves to establish the relative importance of a given feature
in predicting the outcome, is rather negligible. This means that despite the
statistical significance of this type of complements, the variable Object Type,
operationalized in terms of boundedness and picturability, does not provide the
ultimate key to understanding and predicting the choice of complement type
with the two grammatical persons. Even if its relative importance were to be
higher, it would still contradict the correlation that was expected in our second
hypothesis. Not only is the type of complement associated with the third person
non-bounded, but it is also non-picturable.
Table 8: Mixed-effects logistic regression analysis for first-person vs. third-person uses of
mental predicates: Person ~ Object Type+ (1|Lexeme)+ (1|Language).
Fixed effects Estimate Std. error t Value pMCMC
Intercept . . . .
Bounded and picturable −. . −. .
Non-bounded and non-picturable . . . .*
Non-bounded and picturable . . . .
C statistic: . Random effects
Lexeme (variance: .)
Language (variance. .)
Significance codes: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * < 0.05.
5 Incidentally, in the model where boundedness and picturability were treated separately and
where the former variable alone turned out to be significant, the results were parallel.
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The reason for this unexpected result may be twofold. One explanation is
that the simple binary operationalization differentiating between objects that are
picturable and non-picturable, on the one hand, and bounded and non-
bounded, on the other, is too schematic and that finer distinctions need to be
made. It might well be that if more leeway had been allowed in the classifica-
tion, as was the case in the original studies (Fabiszak et al. 2012; Krawczak and
Kokorniak 2012; Fabiszak et al. 2014), the results would have had different
implications. Of course, the other possibility and explanation for the results,
which contradict our two hypotheses, might well be that the potential for
picturing or imagining a given object, irrespective of the granularity of the
distinctions that we should allow for, is not what determines the choice of the
complement of mental predicates relative to the grammatical person of their
syntactic subject. To see which of these two options is the case, we would need
further investigation, involving the re-operationalization of the semantic proper-
ties of mental objects.
5 Conclusions
The present paper has addressed the question of the constructional profile or
construal imposed by the grammatical person on the complement of mental
predicates. In examining this question, we had two objectives, one descriptive,
the other theoretical. First, the goal was to identify the differential effect on
complement choice of first- and third-person uses of five mental predicates
across three languages. More precisely, the aim was to provide further empirical
evidence for the findings obtained in prior research into mental predicates in
Polish by testing two hypotheses, one concerning a syntactic alternation
between two complement types, the other focusing on the semantic properties
of the complement. This, in turn, was to be directly informative with respect to
the long-standing theoretical distinction between performative and descriptive
uses of mental predicates, a distinction dating back to Benveniste (1971) and
taken up by Nuyts (2001) and Verhagen (2005) in more contemporary research
into epistemicity and evidentiality.
We hypothesized that complements encoded as nouns and representing
concrete mental objects will be more commonly associated with third-person
subjects. This is because the speaker attributes a given mental state to another
“nonlocal” (Bresnan et al. 2007) person, and so it may be assumed that such
reified and concrete objects will be more easily attributable to others. On the
other hand, in first-person occurrences of mental predicate constructions, where
the speaker has direct access to his/her own thoughts, a more likely choice may
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be the more dynamic construal imposed by clausal complements, for one thing,
and, for another, a preference for more abstract and intangible objects. As the
results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate, neither of the hypotheses has been
confirmed.
The findings that we obtain here, however, are revealing and provide valuable
feedback, both on the methodological and theoretical plane. Methodologically, an
important implication of our study is that when dealing with semantic dimensions
in language, one should probably allow for more fine-grained distinctions.
Indisputably, elegance and simplicity of explanations, which we were striving for
in the present inquiry, are of great significance in empirical research. However,
binary distinctions in semantics, which only allow for the presence or absence of a
given usage characteristic, are likely to fail to account for any subtle variation,
which normally cannot be expressed in dichotomous terms. This may well be why
our experiment attempting to capture conceptual variation along binary parameters
did not answer our research questions. The theoretical insight that we gain is that
the performative and descriptive uses of mental predicates do not seem to exhibit
statistically significant syntactic differences. More specifically, they do not have
distinct preferences in terms of their complementation pattern. The differences that
we did find were all motivated by lexical variation rather than by the construal
imposed by the grammatical person. This, in turn, may be interpreted to suggest
that clausal complements, despite their inherent dynamism, are no less likely to
occur with descriptive attribution-based uses than nominal complements, which
reify the mental object, arguably rendering it more manageable in the intersubjec-
tive space. This in itself is an interesting finding, even if negative, as it implies that
the answer to the difference in construal between descriptive and performative uses
of mental predicates is more likely to lie in their semantic and pragmatic features
than in their syntactic patterning.
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